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ABSTRACT
Advancement in computing technologies made malware development easier for
malware authors. Unconventional computing paradigms such as cloud computing,
the internet of things, In-memory computing, etc. introduced new ways to develop
more complex and effective malware. To demonstrate this, we designed and im-
plemented a fileless malware that could infect any device that supports JavaScript
and HTML5. In addition, another proof-of-concept is implemented that signifies the
security threat of in-memory malware for in-memory data storage and computing
platforms. Furthermore, a detailed analysis of unconventional malware has been per-
formed using current state-of-the-art malware analysis and detection techniques. Our
analysis shows that, by utilizing the unique characteristics of emerging technologies,
malware attacks could easily deceive the anti-malware tools and evade themselves
from detection. This clearly demonstrates the need for an innovative and effective
detection mechanism. Because of the limitations of existing techniques, we propose a
hybrid approach using specification-based and behavioral analysis techniques together
as an effective solution against unconventional and emerging malware instances. Our
approach begins with the specification development where we present the way of
writing it in a succinct manner to describe the expected behavior of the application.
Moreover, the behavior monitoring component of our approach makes the detection
mechanism effective enough by matching the actual behavior with pre-defined specifi-
cations at run-time and alarms the system if any action violates the expected behav-
ior. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach by applying it for the
detection of in-memory malware that threatens the HazelCast in-memory data grid
platform. In our experiments, we evaluated the performance and effectiveness of the
approach by considering the possible use cases where in-memory malware could affect
the data present in the storage space of HazelCast In Memory Data Grid (IMDG).
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A program, or a software which is executed on a computer system to fulfil the harm-
ful intention of an attacker is usually known as malicious software or malware [43].
The malware attacks are continuously growing and becoming more sophisticated and
stealthy with time [18]. In the era of edge computing, even though advancement
in computing technology is making our life easier, it simultaneously introducing new
ways for malware authors to develop more complex and sophisticated malware. These
emerging malware presents fastest growing problems for all types of users from small
households to large corporations and government bodies. The constantly expanding
use of high level programming languages and software libraries provide advanced ca-
pabilities to not only develop modern applications but also enables cybercriminals
to implement software that can be used to perform malicious operations. Variety
of sophisticated malware such as botnet, fileless, ransomware, In-Memory and IoT
malware became easier to be developed with the new feature-rich programming lan-
guages and off-the-shelf software libraries. Attackers who use unconventional tactics,
they use trusted off-the-shelf and pre-installed system tools to carry out their work
which makes it often difficult for the investigators to determine who is behind the
malicious activity. According to a report by Malwarebytes, attackers got more cre-
ative at avoiding detection by injecting malicious code into online payment platforms
and stealing information out with plugins that did more harm than good [39].
The state of the art malware detection systems use signature or dynamic/behavior
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based detection techniques to decide if a software is malicious or not. Signature-based
detection technique detects attacks on the basis of signatures and not suitable to
detect unknown and unconventional malware attacks. Behavior based overcomes the
limitations of signature based by focusing on system behavior. Its been seen from the
research that behavior based detection with the use of machine learning is an effective
solution for malware detection. However, continuous growth of malware attacks are
managed to bypass malware detection systems powered by machine learning. It gives
high false positive rate and its accuracy also differs in development and production
environment. Another malware detection technique which is most commonly used
in Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [48] is specification-based technique which is
instead of relying on machine learning, based on manually developed specifications
that capture legitimate system behaviors. Specification-based approach overcomes
the limitations of machine learning based detection approach by avoiding the high
false alarms. By realizing the complementary nature of the strengths and weaknesses
of behavior-based and specification-based malware detection techniques, we present
an approach which is utilizing the strengths of both of them in a way that could
mitigate the unconventional malware attacks.
1.2 Motivation
The increasing volume and variety of new malware is posing a serious security threat.
According to AV-Test Security Report, 470.01 million new malware attacks were
reported in the year 2015 and this number had increased to 903.14 million till the mid
of year 2019 [65]. These new malware are evolving, becoming more sophisticated, and
using new ways to target computer systems. Exponential growth in the development
of non traditional malware which uses advance evasion techniques is one of the main
concern of the security community for the last few years. Moreover, the current
state-of-the-art malware analysis and detection tools are way behind the threat level
of unconventional malware. In order to deal with such issues, the need for emerging
and unconventional malware detection became a high priority.
2
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Fig. 1.2.1: Malware trends reported by AV-TEST Security Report [65]
1.3 Problem Statement
With the constant development in the computing technology, hiding malware attacks
from detection is becoming more easy and compact each day for malware authors. It
is not clear that how severe is unconventional malware with respect to the available
tools and techniques of analysis and detection. There is a need to evaluate the
current state-of-the art detection and protection techniques and also to investigate
the methods for malware analysis and reverse engineering. In this aspect, an effective
and efficient detection mechanism is required for the mitigation and detection of
3
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emerging and unconventional malware threats.
1.4 Thesis Contribution
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We offer a detailed study of emerging malware threats, as well as extracting
the characteristics of unconventional malware by performing in-depth analysis
using existing state-of-the-art malware analysis and reverse engineering tech-
niques. The shortcomings of the existing malware analysis approaches against
unconventional malware are also discussed to indicate their limitations
• To know the severity of unconventional malware threats, we develop prototypes
to introduce serious security threats present in modern JavaScript/HTML5 and
in-memory data storage platforms
• We propose specification-based behavior analysis technique to detect the un-
usual activities performed by using unconventional techniques. To the best
of our knowledge, this research is the first effort to apply specification-based
detection technique to detect unconventional malware attacks
1.5 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
• In Chapter 2, we discuss different examples of emerging malware that uses ad-
vance techniques in their development. In addition, study of traditional malware
analysis and detection techniques is highlighted
• In Chapter 3, we demonstrate how unconventional and next-generation malware
threats take advantage of new computing technologies
• In Chapter 4, we show the design and implementation of our approach to miti-
gate the risk of unconventional and emerging malware
4
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• In Chapter 5, analysis of unconventional malware is performed using different
malware analysis tools to indicate the effectiveness of existing techniques. In
addition, experimental results of our implemented detection approach are illus-
trated by applying it on HazelCast IMDG to detect in-memory malware attack





Emerging and unconventional malware attacks have been studied from different per-
spectives in the literature. Recently, security researchers from industry and academia
demonstrated several examples of next-generation malware threats. These malware
threats represent an emerging unconventional generation of malware families that
take advantages of artificial intelligence, new technologies and computing paradigms.
Also, the research in this area tried to detect malicious behavior including both static
and dynamic analysis techniques.
A research team from IBM demonstrated the use of artificial intelligence to engi-
neering malware attacks [34]. In their study, the authors proposed DeepLocker as a
proof of concept to show how next-generation malware could leverage artificial intel-
ligence. DeepLocker is a malware generation engine that malware author could use to
empower traditional malware samples such as WannaCry with artificial intelligence.
A deep Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) was used to customize a malware at-
tack by combining a benign application and a malware sample to generate a hybrid
malware that bypasses detection by exposing (mimicking) benign behaviors. Besides
that, the malware is engineered to unlock its malicious payload when it reaches a tar-
get (endpoint) with a loose predefined set of attributes. In the study, those attributes
were the biometrics feature of the target such as facial and voice features. The mal-
ware uses CNN to detect and confirm target identity, and upon target confirmation,
an encryption key is generated and used by the WannCry malware to encrypt the
files on the target endpoint device. The encryption key is only generated by match-
ing the voice and the facial features of the target. This means reverse engineering the
6
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malware using static analysis is not useful to recover the encryption key.
Another malware threat that take advantages of Deep Learnig was proposed by
Rigaki and Garcia. In this work they used deep learning techniques to create ma-
licious malware samples that evade detection by mimicking the behaviors of benign
applications [57]. They developed a proof of concept to demonstrate how malware
authors could cover the malware C&C traffic. The authors use a Generative Ad-
versarial Network (GANs) to enable malware (e.g., botnet) to mimic the traffic of
a legitimate application and avoid detection. The study showed that it is possible
to modify the source code of malware to receive parameters from a GAN to change
the behaviors of its C&C traffic to mimic the behaviors of other legitimate network
applications, such as Facebook traffic. The enhanced malware samples were tested
against the Stratosphere Linux IPS (slips) system, which uses machine learning to
detect malicious traffic. The experiment showed that 63.42% of the malicious traffic
was able to bypass the detection.
In 2015, Karam (INTERPOL) and Kamluk (Kaspersky lab) introduced a proof
of concept distributed malware that also takes advantage of blockchain technology
[29]. In 2018, Moubarak and et al. provided design and implementation of a K-ary
malware (distributed malware) that takes advantages of the blockchain networks such
as Etherum and Hyperledger [44]. The proposed malware is stored and executed
inside blockchain networks and acts as a malicious keylogger. While detecting a
K-ary malware is an NP-hard problem[14], it is also complicated to implement a
K-ary malware. However, Mubarak’s works demonstrated the simplicity of K-ary
malware development by taking advantage of blockchain technology as distributed
and decentralized network.
In [74], Zhang-Kennedy et al. discussed the ransomware threat in IoT and how
a self-spreading ransomware could infect an IoT ecosystem. The authors pointed
out that the ransomware will mainly lock down IoT devices and disable the essential
functions of these devices. The study focused on identifying the attack vectors in IoT,
the techniques for ransomware self-spreading in IoT, and predicting the most likely
class of IoT applications to be a target for ransomware attacks. Finally, the authors
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identified the techniques the ransomware could apply to lock down IoT devices. In this
study, a proof of concept IoT ransomware was developed to infect an IoT prototype
system built using Raspberry. One interesting aspect in this study is the need for
collaboration or swarming behavior in IoT ransomware, where the IoT ransomware
will spread as much as possible and then lock down the devices, or lock down the
devices and then spread.
Some researchers from FORTH in Greece developed a framework (MarioNet) as
a proof of concept that presents an unconventional method to hijack browser with-
out the userś knowledge [52]. Their work introduced the threat of HTML5 APIś
to remotely control the visitor’s browsers to abuse its resources for unwanted activ-
ities. The authors analyzed the security aspects, access policies, permissions and
threat vectors that are open in HTML5 features and utilized them in their proposed
framework. They explained that, by maintaining an open connection to a command
& control server, the malicious actor can instruct the infected browsers to launch
a powerful Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack by connecting to a specific
internet host. Some other attack vectors such as Cryptocurrency Mining, Distributed
Password Cracking, Malicious or Illegal Data Hosting etc. are also mentioned.
Miller and Valasek developed a proof-of-concept for malicious code that infects
connected cars and lockdown key functions [41]. For instance, the authors demon-
strated the ability for the malicious code to control the steering wheel of a vehicle,
disable the break, lock doors, and shut down the engine while in motion. Behaving as
ransomware, this real example of malware that locks and disables key features in IoT
systems (e.g. connected cars) could have life threatening consequences if the ransom
is not paid. The study explained a design flow in the Controller Area Network (CAN)
protocol that allows malicious and crafted CAN message to be injected into the ve-
hicle CAN channel by a compromised mobile phone that is connected to the vehicle
entertainment unit. It was reported that for some vehicles only the dealership could
restore and patch the vehicle to prevent this attack.
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2.1 Unconventional Malware Types
To develop more complex and sophisticated malware, attackers started utilizing the
new computing paradigms and technologies such as cloud computing, the internet of
things, big data, in-memory computing, and blockchain [61]. These advance com-
puting paradigms introduced new ways that could be misused by malware authors to
perform malicious activities having the ability to evade themselves from anti-malware
tools. Because of using advance evasion techniques, these attacks are able to infect
and compromise a target system without leaving a trace, and reverse engineering
is nearly impossible for such malware attacks. Some of the advance unconventional
malware types are discussed below.
2.1.1 Fileless Malware
Fileless malware is a new class of the memory-resident malware family that success-
fully infects and compromises a target system without leaving a trace on the target
filesystem or second memory (e.g., hard drive). Fileless malware infects the target’s
main-memory (RAM) and executes its malicious payload. Fileless malware is not
just another memory-resident malware. To our knowledge, Fred Cohen developed
the first memory-resident malware (Lehigh Virus) in the early 80s. This usually leads
some researchers to believe that fileless malware is not a new malware threat but
only a new name for an old threat. However, this is not true, fileless malware has
some distinguishing properties. First, malware attacks require some file infection or
writing to the hard drive, this includes traditional memory resident malware. Fileless
malware infection and propagation does not require writing any data to the target
device filesystem. However, it is possible that the malicious payload (e.g., the end
goal ) of the fileless malware writes data to the hard drive, for example, a fileless
ransomware, but again the ransomware propagation and infection are fileless. The
second key property of fileless malware is that it depends heavily on using benign
software utilities and libraries already installed on the target device to execute the
malicious payload. For instance, a fileless ransomware will use cryptographic library
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and APIs already installed on the target to complete its attack rather than installing
a new cryptographic libraries or implement its own.
There are other unique properties of fileless malware, but the most important
ones are the fileless infection approach and the use of benign utilities and libraries
of the compromised machine to execute the malicious payload. Those two properties
of fileless malware make it an effective threat in evading and bypassing sophisticated
anti-malware detection systems. This is because most anti-malware relies on scan-
ning the compromised filesystem to detect malware infections. Also, because fileless
malware use legitimate software utilities and programs to attack computer systems,
it is challenging for anti-malware systems that use dynamic analysis to detect fileless
malware. Moreover, being fileless is an anti-forensics technique, since it does not leave
any trace after the attack is complete, it is tough for forensics investigator to reverse
engineer the malware.
Fileless malware attacks and incidents are already observed in the wild compromis-
ing large enterprises. According to KASPERSKY lab, 140 enterprises were attacked
in 2017 using fileless malwares [19]. Ponemon Institute reported that 77% of the
attacks against companies use fileless techniques [9]. Also, CYREN recently reported
that during 2017 there was over 300% increase in the use of fileless attacks. Moreover,
they expected that the new generation of Ransomware would be fileless [38]. This
expectation proved to be correct when TrendMicro reported the analysis of SORE-
BRECT Ransomware, the first fileless ransomware attack in the wild [66]. However,
we think that it is inaccurate to describe SOREBRECT Ransomware as fileless mal-
ware, since it places an executable file on the compromised machine which injects
the malicious payload into a running system process. Then, it deletes the file and
any trace on the system logs using a self-destruct routine. Because the infection and
the injection of SOREBRECT Ransomware requires placing files on the compromised
host, we do not think it is a true fileless malware. Moreover, deleting the files is not
enough to hide the trace, file carving techniques could be used to recover the deleted
files.
Another common trend in developing fileless malware is the use of Microsoft Pow-
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erShell. PowerShell is a command-line shell and scripting language that allows system
administrators to manage and automate tasks related to running process, the operat-
ing system, and networks. It is pre-installed by default on new Windows versions and
it can be installed on Linux and MacOS systems. PowerShell is a good example of
a benign and powerful system utility that could be used by fileless malware. Several
reports by anti-malware vendors discussed how malware authors take advantages of
PowerShell to develop sophisticated fileless malware [40].
2.1.2 In-Memory Malware
In-memory computing and in-memory data stores is on the rise because of the growing
demand for faster processing and analytics on big data. Storing the data in memory
provides super-fast access to data. In recent years, many organizations started relay-
ing on in-memory computing to build scalable and responsive real-time applications.
Many in-memory data computing platforms such as HazelCast, Redis, Apache Spark
etc. gives the ability to store the data in memory. Even though the new data storage
and computing technology gives better results, at the same time, the critical informa-
tion of the users is at risk. Attackers are continue to seek new ways to compromise
data stored in the memory because valuable information stays in the memory for
a long time before persistent storage. As advance malware are emerging and vul-
nerabilities are exploited, in-memory computing technology can be threatened. A
fileless malware can present severe and aggressive attack by running an in-memory
ransomware that can encrypt the data present in the memory [61]. In addition, the
in-memory computing environments allows to run computing tasks by running cus-
tom code and scripts that make these platforms vulnerable to malicious code injection
attacks.
In 2018, an attack was reported on Redis server which contained malicious code
that downloaded a cryptominer executable file and ran it with a basic evasion tech-
nique to infect publicly available Redis servers [27]. This malware was named as
RedisWannaMine, it demonstrates a worm-like behavior combined with advanced ex-
ploits to increase the attackers infection rate. This malware uses a script to find a
11
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vulnerable server and launches the infection process. MongoDb Ransomware is an-
other example of in-memory malware attacks where different group of hackers taken
control of over 10,000 database instances by taking advantage of the databases that
have been mis-configured and left open [31]. Attackers steal or encrypt the data after
logging into the open database and demands for Bitcoin ransom payment.
2.1.3 Malware in IoT Devices
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an environment of intelligently connected devices and
systems that have the ability to communicate over a network without requiring human
interaction [53]. The IoT environment is advantageous and provide convenience to
the users. However, because most of the IoT devices are connected with internet,
it is an appealing platform for modern and sophisticated malware. In a report, HP
mentioned that 70% of Internet of Things devices vulnerable to attack because of
password security and encryption issues [24]. Ransomware is one of the most serious
security threats present in IoT devices. IoT Ransomware can mainly lock down the
IoT devices and disable the essential functions. IoT Ransomware can mainly lock
down the IoT devices and disable the essential functions.
Zhang-Kennedy et al. [8] discussed the ransomware threat in IoT and how a
self spreading ransomware could infect an IoT ecosystem. The authors pointed out
that the ransomware will mainly lock down IoT devices and disable the essential
functions of these devices. The study focused on identifying the attack vectors in IoT,
the techniques for ransomware self spreading in IoT, and predicting the most likely
class of IoT applications to be a target for ransomware attacks. Finally, the authors
identified the techniques the ransomware could apply to lock down IoT devices.
2.2 Malware Analysis Techniques
The threat of emerging and unconventional malware attacks is continuously growing
which has prompted the focus of researchers towards analysing and mitigating these
new malware variants. Malware analysis is required to develop an effective solution
12
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for malware detection. Analysis of malware gives the ability to understand how a
specific piece of malware behaves so a proper defense mechanism can be built to
protect against that kind of malware. Malware analysts use a wide range of malware
analysis and forensics techniques to see the comprehensive view of malware. Typically,
these techniques mainly classified as static and dynamic [11].
2.2.1 Static Analysis
Static analysis approach provides associated metadata by analyzing the malware bi-
nary without executing it. This analysis approach might not reveal all the required
information, but it can provide interesting information that helps in determining
where to focus the subsequent analysis efforts. It is performed by examining the ma-
licious code and provides interesting facts about the malware such as fingerprinting,
header information, packer detection, strings and import functions etc.
The drawback of this approach is that it is unable to detect obfuscated and poly-
morphic malware specimens. In addition, it is rather difficult to perform because
the malicious source code is not usually available especially in the case of unconven-
tional malware such as Fileless or in-memory malware it is hard to get access to the
code. Furthermore, static analysis can be extremely cumbersome because malware
authors often use code obfuscation techniques such as compression, encryption, self-
modification to evade analysis and de-compilation [71].
Static analysis usually covers the following steps during the analysis of a malware
specimen:
2.2.1.1 Determining the file type
During the analysis, it is important to identify the file type of the suspect binary
to extract the malware’s target operating system. File type can be identified either
by manual way or by using the tools. On Windows operating system, CFF Explorer
[50] is a useful tool for inspecting the executable files and extracts the information
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about file type, internal structure, and resources. Other than this tool, python-magic
module can be used to determine the file type in Python language.
2.2.1.2 Fingerprinting the malware
Fingerprinting also known as signature of a malware that involves generating a cryp-
tographic hash value for the suspect binary. It helps in uniquely identifying a malware
specimen during the analysis and it also uses as an indicator of malware type. Dif-
ferent tools can be used to generate file hashes such as hashMyFiles [49] is a hash
generator tool for Windows that generates hash values for single or multiple files. It
is also possible to generate file hashes using the hashlib [2] module in Python.
2.2.1.3 Multiple Anti-virus Scanning
To determine whether malicious code signature is already generated for the suspect
file or not, multiple anti-virus scanning can be helpful. File signature can provide
addition information about the file that can help in investigation and can reduce the
analysis time [42]. VirusTotal is a well-known web-based malware scanning tool that
allows to scan a file or a website [5]. It provides detailed scan report after scanning
it by a number of anti-virus engines.
2.2.1.4 Determining File Obfuscation
Malware authors uses obfuscation or encryption techniques to hide the inner working
of the malware from malware analysts and security researchers. This technique makes
the reverse engineering and analysis process difficult but some tools might be helpful
during the static analysis process to decode the obfuscated file. Exeinfo PE [6] is a





Dynamic analysis gives the ability to monitor the malware binaries characteristics by
executing them in an isolated environment such as Virtual Machine (VM), emulator
or simulator. This approach has resolved the problems faced during static analysis
by performing the dynamic analysis which includes executing it in a controlled en-
vironment and monitoring various run-time activities like registry changes, network
activities, file system changes etc [71]. Furthermore, it is difficult to evade detection
for obfuscated and polymorphic malware from dynamic analysis.
This technique has some limitations as well such as dynamic analysis is time in-
tensive and resource consuming task [72]. Another drawback is that only a single
malware can be executed at a time for analysis. Furthermore, advance malware be-
haves differently if they detect they are being monitored in a virtual machine and do
not show any malicious activity [63].
Following are some of the monitoring activities that can be carried out during the
dynamic analysis when the malware specimen is executed:
2.2.2.1 Process Monitoring
Process monitoring helps in examining the processes running on the system during the
malware execution. Various tools are used to investigate the processes, Process Hacker
[20] is an open source tool that provides detailed information about newly created
processes and their attributes. It is also helpful in exploring the services, network
connections, disk activities etc. Another well-known tool for Windows operating
system is Process Monitor [4] that also shows real-time processes interaction with
file system, registry, and thread activity [42]. Processes can also be monitored with
Python, Noriben is a Python Script that comes with various functions to collect,
analyze and report run-time indicators of the malware.
15
2. RELATED WORKS
2.2.2.2 File System Monitoring
It involves monitoring the real-time file system activity to determine if any file created,
deleted or updated during the malware execution. It also consider the interception of
System API calls with file system. Correlate file system activity with process activity
and digital trace evidence such as dropped executable, driver modules, hidden files,
and anomalous text or binary files [1].
2.2.2.3 Network Monitoring
To determine the network based indicators, it is required to capture the network
traffic generated during the malware execution that helps in understanding the com-
munication channel used by malware [42]. Wireshark [3] is a packet sniffer tool that
helps in monitoring the network traffic. It has a rich feature set including deep proto-
cols inspection, multi-platform support, decryption support for many protocols and
many more [51].
Lim et al. [36] proposed a malware detection technique by analyzing network
traffic generated when the malware communicates with a malicious C&C server such
as in the case of botnet or ransomware. The proposed technique extracts a set of
features from network flows to present a flows sequence. The authors used different
sequence alignment algorithms to classify malware traffic. They reported an accuracy
above 60% when analyzing malware traffic in a real network environment.
2.2.3 Memory Based Analysis
Alternatively, memory-based analysis is another approach that captures the full sys-
tem behavior and allows to reconstruct the system states from memory. This approach
is getting popularity in malware detection as it provides useful information present in
the dumped memory. Memory based analysis is important when we do not have ac-
cess to the malware sample or malicious code, such as, fileless and in-memory malware
executes their malicious operations in Volatile memory, So, capturing and analysing
the memory image of the infected system can provide some useful information about
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the behavior of the malware post-infection. Both free and commercial tools can be
used that allows to acquire the memory dump to perform analysis. FTK Imager and
Belksoft RAM Capture are well-known tools that allows to perform memory dump
acquisition and analysis, and works with both 32 and 64 bit machines. Volatility is
another famous open source memory analysis framework in Python and supports var-
ious operating systems (Windows, macOS, Linux). With memory analysis, different
information can be extracted such as active/running processes, network connections,
services, loaded libraries or dll’s, and registry entries etc.
Where memory based analysis gives the ability to extract the useful artifacts
present in the memory, some limitations and issues are also there. Data present in
the main memory is not permanent and could be lost if the critical data is not acquired
before the target system restarts or turns off. Acquiring the accurate memory dump
is a biggest challenge as sometimes memory acquisition can results into a damaged
or corrupted memory dump and cannot be analysed because of the either damaged
or missing data structure. This problem is due to issues with the acquisition software
or sometimes may be the fault of the operator. Another issues with this analysis
technique is unsupported memory structures across operating systems. For example,
the memory dump captured from Windows operating system cannot give all the
artifacts while analyzing on Linux or Mac operating system.
2.3 Malware Detection Techniques
Malware authors always try to use advance techniques to deceive the anti-malware
tools. The effectiveness and efficiency of anti-malware tools depends on the techniques
used by them. With the rapid progression of malware development techniques, mal-
ware detection tools also use various techniques to avoid the catastrophic effects of





Signature based detection approach is useful in the detection of known malware be-
cause this technique depends on the unique signature of the malware to identify which
family this malware belongs to. This approach is most widely used in many malware
detectors but it is unable to detect unknown malware. Advance malware attacks
apply polymorphic techniques which can change their signatures. New malware can
not be detected with this method because their signatures are not developed at this
stage. The other disadvantage of this approach is that, it is susceptible to evasion
as it can be easily evaded by the hackers using simple encryption, compression or
obfuscation techniques.
S. Yoon et al. proposed a method to generate unique signatures for malicious
Javascripts [73]. The authors used content-based signature generation techniques
and utilized the Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) and Bal-
anced Iterative Reducing and Clustering with Hierarchies methods to generate the
conjunction signatures for Javascripts [73]. Although, signature-based analysis can
help in detecting several malicious behaviours, the work in [73] is based on the as-
sumption that the attack type of the input Javascripts is known, which is not always
a practical assumption in real-life environments.
Naeem et al. proposed a static analysis technique to detect IoT malware [46]. The
proposed technique converts a malware file to a grayscale image and extracts a set of
visual features from the malware image to train an Suuport Vector Machine (SVM)
classifier that could distinguish between malware families using visual features. Using
a dataset of 9342 samples that belong to 25 malware families, they reported 97.4%
accuracy.
2.3.2 Anomaly Detection Technique
This technique is not susceptible to the shortcomings of signature-based detection
and monitors what a program does while running rather than just considering the
static characteristics. A behavior-based detector determines whether a program is
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malicious by inspecting its activities at run time. The main goal of behavior-based
techniques is to predict the future behaviour of the system in order to deny any
unexpected behaviors. This technique contains two phases where first phase involves
monitoring the events and behavior to generate profiles by learned behavior and the
second phase is the detection phase where the generated profile is compared against
the running behavior and differences are flagged as potential attacks. The technique
focuses on the actual dynamics of the malware execution by monitoring the dynamic
behaviour of malicious activity rather than its static characteristics.
Where this technique comes with a solution to detect unknown or zero day mal-
ware attacks, at the same time, it also have some disadvantages. It needs to keep
updating the data describing the behavior of the system, it needs more resources such
as CPU time, memory and disk space etc. In Addition, non-availability of promis-
ing False Positive Ratio (FPR) and also high amount of scanning time are the main
disadvantages of these behavior based malware detection methods [16].
Some dynamic/behavior analysis approaches has been studied for malware detec-
tion. Omind and Nathan proposed a behavioral-based malware detection method
using a deep belief network [13]. The proposed method collected data about malware
behaviors from a sandbox environment. The collected data are API calls, registry
entries, visited websites, accessed ports, and IP addresses. Then using a deep neural
network of eight layers, it generates malware signatures. These signatures could be
used to train malware detectors. In their experiments, they reported up to 95.3%
detection accuracy with a malware detector utilizing the SVM algorithm.
Kilgallon et al. applied machine learning and dynamic malware analysis [33]. The
proposed technique gathers register value information and API calls made by the
monitored malware binaries. The collected information is stored in vector structures
and analyzed using a value set analysis method. Then, they used a linear similarity
metric to compare unseen malware to known malware binaries. Their experiment





It is the derivative of behavior-based detection that tries to overcome the typical
high false alarm rate associated with it [58]. This technique monitors the program
execution and detects if there is any deviation of their behavior from the defined
specifications, rather than detecting the occurrence of specific attack patterns. This
technique is almost similar to behavior based detection which uses the machine learn-
ing approaches to train the model with intended behavior of the application but the
difference is that instead of relying on machine learning techniques, it is based on
manually developed specifications that capture legitimate system behavior [58]. The
advantage of this technique is that it can detect both known and unknown malware
instances and the level of false positive is low with this detection approach.
Tseng et al.[67] proposed a specification-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
to detect attacks on Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV). In their approach,
they extracted the correct AODV routing behavior and described the specifications
using finite state machines. In their specifications, they specify the rules to restrict
the way the messages are exchanged by the network nodes. Distributed network has
been monitored in their experiments to detect run-time violation of the specifications.
The work described in [30] introduced a specification-based methodology to detect
the exploitation of SQL injection vulnerabilities. They defined the syntactic struc-
ture of SQL queries in their specifications and monitors the application to detect the
queries that are in the violation of the specifications. They evaluated their approach
by executing 2,450 queries, 420 of which were poisoned with SQL injection attacks.
Their experiments illustrates that specification-based approach is efficient in prac-
tice and effective with 0% False positive and negative rate in case of detecting SQL
injections.
Another research shows that the combination of specification-based technique with
anomaly-based detection approach gives more effective results against network intru-
sion detection [62]. Their specifications are based on extended finite state automate
(EFSA) to derive the gateway’s behavior at the IP protocol layer. With the use of
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specification-based techniques, they simplifies the problem of feature selection. Then
statistical machine learning is applied over the derived specifications to detect the
anomalies on the network. In their experiments, they detected all of the probing and





In this chapter, we demonstrate that how unconventional and next-generation mal-
ware can take advantage of advance computing paradigms. We show that malware
authors can develop complex and sophisticated malware with less effort. In our work,
we explore different kinds of vulnerabilities in modern web browsers and in-memory
data computing and storage platforms. In addition, we show the design and imple-
mentation of a fileless malware which is taking advantage of powerful capabilities of
JavaScript & HTML5 APIs to misuse them for controlling a visitor’s browser and
abusing its resources for malicious purposes without leaving a file on the target sys-
tem. Furthermore, a proof-of-concept of an in-memory malware is presented that
exploits the vulnerabilities in an in-memory data computing platform to infect the
valuable data stored in the memory. Various in-memory infection scenarios are il-
lustrated in our proof-of-concept to show how it can launch wide variety of stealthy
attacks on in-memory data grids.
3.1 JSLess: Fileless JavaScript Memory-resident
Malware
To highlight the significance of the threats posed by fileless malware, we present a
practical design and implementation of a fileless malware as a proof-of-concept. We
investigate the possibility of developing a fileless malware using modern JavaScript
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features that were introduced with HTML5. In our assessment of the potential threats
of fileless malware attacks, we explore the use of benign JavaScript and HTML5
features to develop fileless malware. Based on our analysis we implemented JSLess as
a proof-of-concept fileless Javascript malware that successfully infects a web browser
and executes several malicious payloads. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
fileless malware introduced in web browsers and exhibits that fileless malware attacks
are not just limited to PowerShells and Windows environment. Next, we identify the
malicious potential of new benign features in web technology and how they could be
used to develop fileless malware.
3.1.1 Benign Features with Malicious Potentials
With the introduction of HTML5, a new generation of modern web applications
become a reality. This is mainly because HTML5 introduced a rich-set of powerful
APIs and features that can be used by JavaScript. Some of the new features and APIs
in HTML focus on enabling the development of web apps with high connectivity and
performance. Further, HTML5 provides a set of APIs that allow web applications
written in JavaScript to access information about the host running the web app
and also other peripheral devices connected to the host. For instance, a web app
developed with HTML5 and JavaScript could have access to the user geo-location,
device orientation, mic, and camera.
While these new powerful features were proposed to improve web application
development, we found in our analysis of these features that hackers and malware
authors could misuse them. Many of these benign features have serious malicious
potential. In this section, we will mainly focus on HTML5 features that were proposed
to boost web application performance, scalability, and connectivity.
3.1.1.1 Web Sockets
WebSocket is a new communication protocol that enables a web-client and a web-
server to establish a two-way (full-duplex) interactive communication channel over
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a single TCP connection [47]. It provides bi-directional real-time communication
which is an urgent requirement for modern interactive web applications. With Web-
Socket, the communication method between the web-client and the web-server is
not limited to pull-communication [Peter Lubbers & Frank Greco]. Instead, push-
communication and even an interactive communication become possible. For this
reason, WebSocket becomes the dominated technology in developing instant messag-
ing apps, gaming applications, streaming services, or any web app which requires
data exchange between the client and the server in real-time.
WebSocket is currently supported by all major web browsers such as Chrome,
Firefox, Safari, Edge, and IE. Moreover, the WebSocket protocol is supported by
common programming languages such as Java, Python, C#, and others. This enables
the development of desktop, mobile apps, or even microservices that communicate
using WebSocket as a modern and convenient communication protocol.
It is clear that using WebSocket the connectivity of web apps moves to a new level
of high quality and reliability. However, WebSocket is considered by web security
researchers a security risk [28]. WebSocket enables a new attack vector for malicious
actors. Common web attacks such as cross-site scripting (XSS) and man in the middle
(MitM) are possible over WebSockets. WebSocket by design does not obey the same-
origin policy; this means the web browser will allow a WebSocket script to connect to
different web pages even if they do not share the same origin (same URI scheme, host
and port number). Again WebSocket by design is not bound by cross-origin resource
sharing (CORS). This means a web app running inside the client web browser could
request resources that have a different origin from the web app. This flexibility could
be easily abused by malicious actors as we will demonstrate in the next section.
3.1.1.2 Web Worker
Originally JavaScript is a single-threaded language which means in any web app there
is only a single line of code or statement that can be executed at any given time. As
a result, JavaScript cannot perform multiple tasks simultaneously. WebWorker is a
new JavaScript feature that was introduced with HTML5 to improve the performance
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of the JavaScript application [7]. WebWorker enables JavaScript code to run in
a background thread separate from the main execution thread of a web app. In
other words WebWorker allows web applications to execute tasks in the background
without impacting the user interface as it works completely separate from the UI
thread. For this reason, WebWorkers are typically used to run long and expensive
operations without blocking the UI. For instance, the code in Listing 3.1 initialize
a new web worker object and runs the code in worker.js asynchronously in a new
thread. WebWorker should be used to do computationally intensive tasks to avoid
blocking the UI or any other code executed in the main thread. If a computationally
intensive task executes in the main JavaScript thread, the web app will freeze and
become unresponsive to the user. WebWorker is currently supported by all major
web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Edge, and IE.
1 if (typeof(worker) == "undefined") {
2 worker = new Worker("worker.js");
3 }
Listing 3.1: WebWorker Initialization Example
As we can see WebWorker is an essential feature for developing a modern and
responsive web application. However, the devil is in the details. While WebWorker
seems like a harmless feature, it opens the door for several malicious scenarios and
security issues. For example, it allows DOM-based cross-site scripting (XSS) [64].
CORS does not bind it, and hence a web worker could share and access resources from
different origins. But in our opinion, the most critical security issue with WebWorker
is its ability to insert silent running JavaScript code. This could enable a malicious
payload to run in a background thread created by malicious or compromised web
apps. One possible example is using WebWorker with a malicious web app to preform
cryptocurrency mining without the users’ consent. The WebWorker will terminate if
the worker completed the execution of the script or if the user closes the web browser
or the web app that created the web worker object.
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3.1.1.3 Service Workers
ServiceWorker is another new appealing JavaScript feature. We could consider Ser-
viceWorker as a special type of WebWoker. ServiceWorker allows running JavaScript
code in a separate background thread. This is very similar to WebWorker but unlike
WebWorker, the lifetime of the ServiceWorker is not tied to a specific webpage or even
the web browser [15]. This means even if the user navigates away from the web app
that created the ServiceWorker or terminated the web browser, the ServiceWorker
will continue to run in the background. The ServiceWorker will normally terminate
when it’s complete (e.g., execute all the computation tasks) or received a termination
signal from the web server, or terminate abnormally as a result of a crash, system
reboot or shutdown.
ServiceWorker was introduced to enable rich offline experience to the users and
improve the performance of modern web apps. The code in Listing 3.2 shows an
example that creates a ServiceWorker from the file sw demo.js. ServiceWorkers
share the same security issues and risks that exist in WebWorkers but the lifetime of
the security risks are persistent.
1 window.addEventListener(’load’, () => {
2 navigator.serviceWorker.register(’/sw_demo.js’)
3 .then((registration) => {
4 // ServiceWorker registered successfully
5 }, (err) => {
6 // ServiceWorker registration failed
7 });
8 });
Listing 3.2: ServiceWorker Registration Example
3.1.2 JavaScript Fileless Malware
The benign JavaScript features we introduced in the above sections could be used
to implement a fileless JavaScript malware. To demonstrate this threat, we design
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and implement JSLess as a PoC fileless malware. We design JSLess as a fileless
polymorphic malware, with a dynamic malicious payload, that applies both timing
and event-based evasion.
3.1.2.1 Infection Scenarios
In our investigation, we define two main infection scenarios. The first scenario is
when the victim (web user) visits a malicious web server or application as illustrated
in Figure 3.1.1. In this case, the malicious web server will not show any malicious
behaviors until a specific event triggers the malicious behavior. In our demo, the
attack posts specific text messages on a common chat room. The message act as an
activation command to the malware. When the message is received the malware is
injected dynamically into the victim’s browser and starts running as part of the script
belonging to the public chat room.
The second infection scenario is when the malware compromise a legitimate web
application or server to infect the web browsers of the users who are currently visiting
the compromised website as illustrated in Figure 3.1.2. In this case, both the website
and the website visitors are victims of the malware attack. The malware will open
a connection with the malicious server (e.g., C&C server) that hosts the malware to
download the malicious payload or receive a command from the malware authors to
execute on the victim browser.
Note that in both scenarios the malicious code infection/injection happens on the
client side, not the server side.
3.1.2.2 JSLess Operational Scenario
JSLess delivered to the victim web browser through a WebSocket connection. When
the victim visits a malicious web server, the WebSocket connection will be part of the
web app on the malicious server. However, if the malware authors prefer to deliver
JSLess by compromising a legitimate web app/server to increase in the infection rate,
then the WebSocket delivery code could be added into a third-party JavaScript library
(e.g. JQuery). Almost all modern web application relies on integrating third-party
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Fig. 3.1.1: JavaScript Fileless Malware First Infection Scenario
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Fig. 3.1.2: JavaScript Fileless Malware Second Infection Scenario
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JavaScript files. The WebSocket delivery code is relatively (see the code in Listing 3.3)
and could easily be hidden in a malicious third-party script library that is disguised
as legitimate. Alternatively, the code could be inserted via an HTML injection attack
on a vulnerable site that does not correctly sanitize the user input. The WebSocket
API is used to deliver the malware source code in JavaScript to the victim browser.
Once the connection is opened, it downloads the JavaScript code and uses it to create
a new script element which is appended as a child to the HTML file’s body element.
This causes the downloaded script to be executed by the client’s web browser.
1 MalWS = new WebSocket(’{{WSSurl}}/KeyCookieLog.js’);
2 MalWS.onmessage = function(e) {
3 sc = document.createElement(’script’);
4 sc.type = ’text/javascript’;
5 sc.id = ’MalSocket’;
6 sc.appendChild(document.createTextNode(e.data));
7 B = document.getElementsByTagName("body");
8 B[0].appendChild(sc);
9 };
Listing 3.3: malicious payload delivered with websocket
Delivering the malware payload over WebSocket and dynamically inject it into
the client’s web browser provide several advantages to malware authors. The fact
that the malware code is only observable when the web browser is executing the code
and mainly as a result of a trigger event provides one important fileless behavior
for the malware. The malicious code is never written to the victim’s file system.
Using WebSocket to deliver the malware payload does not raise any red flags by anti-
malware systems since it is a popular and common benign feature. Using benign
APIs is another essential characteristic of fileless malware.
The fact that JSLess can send any malicious payload for many attack vectors and
inject arbitrary JavaScript code with the option to obfuscate the injected malicious
code enables the design of polymorphic malware. All of these attributes make JSLess
a powerful malware threat that can easily evade detection by anti-malware systems.
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For instance, a pure JavaScript logger could be quickly injected in the user’s browser
to captures user’s keystroke events and send them to the malware C&C server over
WebSocket. Note that benign and native JavaScript keystroke capturing APIs are
used which again will not raise any red flags. Figure 3.1.3 shows an exmaple of
an injected JavaScript key logger that captures keystroke events and send it to the
malware C&C server over WebSockect.
Fig. 3.1.3: Obfuscated JavaScript code injection
Obfuscated JavaScript code is injected in the body of the web page which opens a
secure WebSocket connection with Remote C&C Server to send the User’s keystroke
information to the attacker
To utilize the victim system’s computation power or run the malicious scripts in a
separate thread from the main UI thread, JSless takes advantage of WebWorkers. This
allows JSless to run malicious activities that are computationally intensive, such as
cryptocurrency mining. The WebWorker script is downloaded from the C&C server.
The JavaScript code in Listing 3.4 shows how the malicious WebWorker code could be
obtained as a blob object and initiated on the victim’s browser. In conjunction with
the importScripts and createObjectURL functions, we were able to load a script from
a different domain hosted on the different server and executed it in the background
of the benign web app.
31
3. UNCONVENTIONAL MALWARE DEVELOPMENT
1 blob = new Blob(["self.importScripts(’{{HTTPSurl}}/foo.js’);"],
2 {type: ’application/Javascript’});
3
4 w = new Worker(URL.createObjectURL(blob));
Listing 3.4: Breaking Same-origin Policy with ImportScripts()
Until this point one limitation of JSless malware-framework is that fact that the
malware will terminate as soon as the user closes his web browser or navigates away
from the compromised/malicious web server. This limitation is not specific to JSless,
it is the common behaviors of any fileless malware. In fact, many malware authors
sacrifice the persistence of their malware infection by using fileless malware to avoid
detection and bypass anti-malware systems. However, that does not mean fileless
malware authors are not trying to come up with new methods and techniques to
make their fileless malware persistent. In our investigation to provide persistence for
JSless even if the user navigates away from the compromised/malicious web page or
closes the web browser, we took advantage of the ServiceWorker API to implement a
malware persistence technique with minimal footprint.
To achieve malware persistence, we used the WebSocket API to download a script
from the malicious server. After downloading the ServiceWorker registration code
from the malicious server as shown in Listing 3.2, it registers a sync event as shown
in Listing 3.5, cause the downloaded code to execute and stay alive even if the user
has navigated away from the original page or closed the web browser.
The malicious code will continue to run and terminate normally when it is com-
pleted or abnormally as result of exception, crash or if the user restarts his machine.
Note that when we use ServiceWorker, a file is created and temporarily stored on the
client machine while the ServiceWorker is running. This is the only case where JSless
will place a file on the victim machine, and it is only needed for malware persistence.
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1 self.addEventListener(’sync’, function (event) {
2 if (event.tag === ’mal-service-worker’) {
3 event.waitUntil(malServiceWorker()
4 .then((response) => {





10 function malServiceWorker() {
11 // Malicious activity can be performed here
12 }
Listing 3.5: ServiceWorker Implementation for malicious purpose
In the proof-of-concept implementation for the malware persistence with Service-
Worker, we implemented a MapReduce system. In this malicious MapReduce system,
all the current infected web browsers receive the map function and a chunk of the
data via WebSocket. The map function executes as a ServiceWorker and operates
over the data chunks sent by the malicious server. When the ServiceWorker finishes
executing the map function, it returns the result to the malicious server via Web-
Socket. When the malicious server receives the results from the ServiceWorker, it
performs the reduce phase and returns the final result to the malware author.
3.2 In-Memory Malware
Nowadays, in-memory data storage and computing platforms getting popularity in
many organizations. To reduce the query loads on databases and to improve the appli-
cations performance, in-memory data storage gives the ability to store the data within
memory in a highly distributed manner. Loading the data into memory increases the
performance of applications hundred times faster with low-latency transaction pro-
cessing offered by in-memory technology. Where this new technology getting into rise,
at the same time, valuable information of individuals and organizations is at greater
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risk of compromise. As more organizations move to adopt in-memory technology,
attackers are continue to strive for finding new ways to compromise the information
stored in the memory.
3.2.1 HazelCast
To demonstrate the unconventional malware threat for in-memory computing and
storage platforms, we have developed a Proof of Concept (PoC) for in-memory mal-
ware in Java programming language. In our PoC, we targeted HazelCast [23] which is
fastest in-memory data grid, combined with high-speed event processing. Hazelcast
is a distributed In-Memory Data storage and computing platform that supports high
scalability and data distribution in a clustered environment. HazelCast cluster con-
sists of multiple members (also called nodes) and data is evenly distributed among all
the nodes within a cluster, allowing for horizontal scaling of processing and available
storage [22].
3.2.1.1 Member Discovery Mechanism
Hazelcast supports auto-discovery of nodes and intelligent synchronization to update
the data on all the nodes. Cluster members automatically join together that takes
place with various discovery mechanisms which is used by cluster members to find
each other [22].
Hazelcast uses the following discovery mechanisms:
• TCP: It discover members by TCP/IP, need to list the hostnames or IP
addresses of all or a subset of the members that can be a part of the cluster.
It does not require to list all of the members, but at least one of the listed
members has to be active in the cluster when a new member joins
• Multicast: In this discovery mechanism, the cluster members do not need to
know the concrete addresses of the other members, as it allows cluster members
to find each other using multicast communication. It allows multiple members
to join together which are activated on the same network
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• Cloud Discovery: It is useful when to discover members without providing
the list of possible IP addresses. This mechanism allows applications to be
deployed in various cloud infrastructure such as AWS, GCP, Azure, etc. and
enables Hazelcast members to dynamically discover each other basis on the
cloud configuration
3.2.2 Design & Implementation
We have implemented a PoC of in-memory malware on HazelCast IMDG Application
developed using Java Maven. Hazelcast IMDG supports two modes of operations in
the architecture deployment: embedded and client-server.
Embedded Topology: In an embedded deployment, each member (JVM) includes
both the application and Hazelcast IMDG services and data [22]. Embedded deploy-
ment architecture can be seen in Figure 3.2.1.
Fig. 3.2.1: HazelCast IMDG Embedded Topology [22]
Client-Server Topology: As it is illustrated in Figure 3.2.2, in a client-server de-
ployment, Hazelcast IMDG services and data are centralized on one or more members
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and are accessed by the application through clients [22].
Fig. 3.2.2: HazelCast IMDG Client-Server deployment [22]
In our work, we have implemented HazelCast IMDG application using client-server
topology because it gives greater flexibility to manage the cluster. In addition, we are
showing in our PoC that this architecture is vulnerable to serious security threats.
As it is mentioned above that HazelCast supports various Cluster members discovery
mechanism. We have considered Multicast and TCP cluster discovery protocols to
perform some malicious infection scenarios in our PoC. In Multicast discovery mech-
anism, cluster members do not need to know each other’s specific IP addresses. As
soon as a new member is initiated on the same network, it will become the part of
the cluster without any extra configuration. It means one common network can only
have one cluster at a time. Lines of code showing in Listing 3.6 is used to create new
HazelCast Cluster members with some network configurations.
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1 Config config = new Config();
2 NetworkConfig network = config.getNetworkConfig();
3 network.setPort(5701).setPortCount(20);
4 network.setPortAutoIncrement(true);
5 HazelcastInstance hazelcast_member = Hazelcast.newHazelcastInstance(config);
Listing 3.6: Create HazelCast Cluster Members
We have also implemented the TCP for cluster discovery where we need to specify
IP address of at least one cluster member. When a new member is discovered with
the specified IP address, it becomes the part of that cluster and get access to data
present in the memory as well as can perform operations on that data. In our case,
IP address of the leader member is 137.207.235.122 and we initiated an other member
on the local network with the IP address 137.207.235.124.
After setting up the cluster with different members, HazelCast distributed data
structure is considered for storing the data in the main memory of the machines.
HazelCast Map is distributed implementation of Java map that can store the entries
and even distribute them on all the cluster members. We have used HazelCast Map
and stored some random entries in the map from one Cluster member. Because of the
distributed nature of HazelCast Map, same data will be available for all the members
present in the cluster.
3.2.3 Infection Scenarios
Our in-memory malware PoC demonstrates how attackers can launch an attack to
steal the valuable information stored in the memory of HazelCast Cluster members.
Our research shows that TCP and Multicast are two of the discovery mechanisms
offered by HazelCast to locate the members within a cluster which are not secure
enough and can be exploited by the attackers. By leveraging TCP and Multicast
discovery mechanisms offered by HazelCast, we initiated an attack scenario where a
member/node with malicious intention becomes the part of the cluster and perform
unusual activities.
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Fig. 3.2.3: In-Memory Malware First Attack Scenario
As Figure 3.2.3 is illustrating an attack scenario where a malicious node/member
is being inserted in the HazelCast cluster. By this member, a connection with HTTP
request is being opened to a malicious command & control server which is associated
with the attacker. As the same copy of data is distributed among all the members
present in the same cluster, so, the member inserted with malicious intention can
steal the valuable information and send it to the attacker. After getting access to the
data present in the cluster, attackers can also execute the operations to encrypt the
data and ask for ransom. In our PoC, after opening the connection with C&C server,
we have downloaded an encryption key to encrypt the data.
Another attack scenario can be seen in Figure 3.2.4, where a client is connect-
ing with HazelCast cluster. There are three different ways to connect to a running
HazelCast clusters through Clients [22].
• Native Client: Native Client enables to perform HazelCast operations by
connecting to one of the cluster members and delegates all cluster wide opera-
tions to it. Client will transparently switches to another live member when the
relied cluster member dies
• Memcache Client: A Memcache client written in any language can talk
directly to Hazelcast cluster. No additional configuration is required. An entry
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Fig. 3.2.4: In-Memory Malware Second Attack Scenario
written with a memcache client can be read by another memcache client written
in another language
• REST Client: Hazelcast provides a REST interface that provides an HTTP
service in each cluster member, so, data can be accessed and modified using
HTTP protocols
To connect with cluster by any of the above mentioned ways, just the IP address
and port of the cluster member is required. After connection, clients can access and
modify the data in the HazelCast cluster. To utilize the cluster members’ computa-
tional power, in our PoC, we are connecting to HazelCast cluster using Native Client
and delegate the tasks to cluster members to consume the resources. In addition, we
modify the data by applying encryption on it.
3.3 Attack Vectors
Unconventional malware attacks have the ability to execute malicious behavior that
supports a wide variety of malicious attacks. Here are the most common attack
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vectors that JSLess and in-memory malware could execute:
3.3.1 Data Stealing
On infection, JSLess can easily collect keystrokes, cookie and web storage data, as
demonstrated in our PoC. Also, it could control multimedia devices and capture data
from a connected mic or webcam using native browser WebRTC APIs. In case of in-
memory malware, after inserting a member with malicious intention in the HazelCast
cluster, it can get access to the data stored in the cluster memory. This valuable
information can be stolen and send it to the malicious command & control server
which is associated with the malware attacker.
3.3.2 In-Memory Ransomware
In-Memory malware can act as a ransomware by encrypting the data stored in the
memory such as recent transaction, financial information, etc. After getting access
to the data, the valuable information can be encrypted and ask for ransom to get the
original data back.
3.3.3 DDoS
JSless malicious C&C server could orchestrate all the currently infected web browsers
to connect to a specific URL or web server to perform a DDoS attack. In this case,
JSless constructs a botnet of infected browsers to execute the DDoS attack.
3.3.4 Resource Consumption Attack
In this case, JSless could use the infected users’ browser to run computationally inten-
sive tasks such as cryptocurrency mining, password cracking, etc. The MapReduce
system we implement as part of JSless is an example of managing and running compu-
tationally intensive tasks. Also, beside the attacks which we have implemented in our
JSless it is possible to perform other attacks like Click Fraud, RAT-in-the-Browser
(RitB) Attacks, and many other web-based attacks.
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In-memory malware can also execute this attack because HazelCast provides dis-
tributed computing facility to make the platform more scalable. In this case, tasks
can be assigned to other members within a cluster and malicious member can utilize








This chapter presents the design and implementation of a malware detection technique
to mitigate the emerging and unconventional malware threats. Continuous behavior
monitoring and identifying the correctness of those behaviors at run time is one of
the possible solutions to overcome the limitations of current state-of-the art malware
detection techniques against unconventional malware threats. Due to the limitation
of the existing malware detection techniques, the specification-based approach is used
with existing detection methods to add the efficiency in the detection process. In this
context, we propose a solution based on continuous behavior analysis validating with
application specifications or policies to detect emerging threats which uses advance
evasion techniques to hide them from traditional anti-malware tools. This detection
technique is based on the fact that advance malware use fileless attack methods and
take advantage of legitimate tools for malicious purposes which makes it difficult
for the existing malware detection approaches to find such attacks. The proposed
approach consists of of two different malware detection techniques which are namely
specification-based and behavior-based. The first step in our approach is to develop
the specifications for the application that can be expressed in a document to describe
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the expected behavior of that particular application. This new approach utilizes
the specifications that describes the intended behavior produced by the application.
These pre-defined specifications are then matched with the actual behavior of the
application during the run-time. If any of the action event do not conform, the
action is considered as behavior violations and inform the system about malicious
activity.
Specification-based monitoring compares the behavior of the application func-
tionalities or activities with their associated behavior specifications that captures the
correct behavior of the actions. The specifications are usually manually crafted based
on the security policy, functionalities of the objects, and expected usage [68]. There-
fore, if the intended behavior of the application has been explicitly pre-determined, it
is possible to detect malicious modification that can alter the behavior of the appli-
cation at run-time. The new methodology consists of a set of phases that should be
followed, important events need to be analyzed and checked in order to make sure it
has not been poisoned with the malicious intention. The proposed malware detection
methodology benefits by performing the detection process at run-time and monitors
the activities while application is running.
Anomaly based detection techniques also perform operations by making profiles
of normal behavior of the application which is usually established through automated
training and then it is compared with the actual activity of the system to indicate
any significant modifications in the running behavior. Anomaly detection can detect
unknown attacks, but often with the high false alarm rate [21]. This approach is also
not a good option in case of unconventional malware attacks because of the unique
properties of such attacks where they can leverages the already present non-malicious
system tools and might be marked as normal operations by anti-malware tools that
uses anomaly-based detection techniques. On the other hand, in specification-based
detection [35], the correct behaviors of critical objects are manually abstracted and
crafted as behavior specifications, which are compared with the actual behavior of
the objects. Specification-based monitoring is the most useful anti-malware approach
which gives optimal protection. It has some advantages over anomaly-based detection
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method as it gives the flexibility in policy construction and it can result in a very low
false positives [45].
4.2 Architecture
In order to perform unconventional malware detection, we have used two malware de-
tection techniques in a way that they could be considered as an efficient and effective
detection mechanism. Figure 4.2.1 depicts the architecture of the proposed technique,
which consists of a behavior monitoring module and a specification machining mod-
ule. Behavior monitoring module analyze the activities performed by the application
and specification matching module matches those actions with pre-defined expected
behavior.
The components and modules of the proposed system are described in a greater
detail below.
4.2.1 Behavior Specifications
Specifications are the most important component of the proposed technique. Spec-
ifications are the rules which are documented for describing the desired behavior of
the application. It does not include how the application function should be imple-
mented, instead, it focuses on how those functions should behave. In our approach,
we define specifications to express the expected behavior of the application that will
be monitored during the run time in order to make sure the correctness of the appli-
cation’s behavior. Specifications express the correct behavior and any other behavior
will be classified as anomalous if it deviates from the specified behavior. For each
action that needs to be monitored, the proposed methodology defines a specification
that defines the rules or policies that should be followed by the application to be
considered as a valid action. To get accurate results against unconventional malware
detection, specification needs to be designed through a careful and deliberate process.
The length of the specifications depend on the number of critical entities that needs
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Fig. 4.2.1: Architecture of the proposed approach
Illustrate the architecture of Hybrid approach which consists of two main components
that interact with each other to detect malicious activities against emerging and
unconventional malware attacks
to be monitored in the application.
4.2.2 Behavior Monitoring Module
When functionality of a software application is analyzed and observed by executing
it is known as dynamic or behavioral analysis [17]. Each activity occurs during the
program execution passes through a validation process that checks it for the potential
existence of any malicious intention. In our system, behavior monitoring module
captures the events at particular states performed by an entity to determine the
validity of that behavior. It deals with the occurrence of the application events where
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each event that is intercepted confirms its correctness with respect to the specifications
that have already been documented. To decide, which activities should be monitored
depends on the targeted application platform, the critical components which could
be victimized by the attacker and the means of attack. This module in our approach
helps to keep a constant monitoring of the events and activities happening in the
application to validate the behavior and detecting the unwanted actions that might
be initiated by attackers using unconventional means of attack.
4.2.3 Specification Matching Module
This module triggers a comparison of the subsequent behavior with the pre-defined
rules or specifications and alerts the application if any deviation in the running be-
havior is found. If the action is matched with the specified behavior and it certifies
that the functionality of the application on the occurrence of this particular event
does match to the specifications, it means application is running as per the expected
behavior. In the opposite case, if it is recognized that the event violates the spec-
ifications, the action is marked as malicious activity and generates an alarm. This
module implement a specification parser to extract the rules and match them with
the activities happening in the events. This parser is based on the language used for
defining the specifications of the application. Specification matching module loads
the rules written for particular events at a state and validates the correctness of that
event in order to take the decision. If the behavior is confirmed to the specification,
then it is considered to be valid. If the event behavior does not match with a rule of
the specification, it concludes that an attack has modified it.
4.3 Design & Implementation
In our work, few steps has taken into consideration for implementing the proposed
methodology. First, outline the entities which needs to be monitored in the targeted
application. Second, find out the possible states that an entity can have during the
execution. Finally, the events that can be generated by the selected entities at a
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particular state. These steps help in describing the specifications of the application
and observing the unusual activities during the run-time.
In general, there can be many entities and their relevant states in an application
at run-time. In this context, the system can be explained with a set E of entities
(representing the entities of interest), a set S of states (possible state that Entity E
can take) and a set of A actions (representing the events that can be occurred with
an Entity E). Specifically, the following declarations specify E, S and A.
• E is the set of entities {e1, e2, ....., en}
• The finite set of possible states that an entity can have, may be declared as S :
{s1, s2, ....., sn}
• A is the set of actions {a1, a2, ....., an} that can be occurred by an entity at a
particular state
By considering the above declarations, we can represent the normal behavior of
the components of any application. This normal behavior can be used to specify the
rules to detect the abnormal activities. To document the expected behavior of an
application, first, we can list down the entities, then the possible states and actions
of those entities can be extracted. If we take the example of HazelCast in-memory
cluster, the possible entities can be the members and clients that can perform various
actions at different states. In our approach, whenever an action will be performed
by an entity, the associated behavior monitoring events will also be triggered to
determine the correctness of that action. Before monitoring the actions, we need to
specify the rules of what an entity can do and what can not do at a particular state.
We are considering the Finite State Machine (FSM) [12] for making the specifications
extraction process more simpler and reliable. We choose state machines because it
can model the execution flow of an application and gives the ability to validate the
actions at given states. Representing the normal behavior of an application with FSM
and extracting the specifications is described in a greater in the next sections.
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4.3.1 Specification Development
The specifications are captured in a standard document that specifies the expected
behavior of the application. For describing the specifications, we observe the normal
behavior of the application with the help of finite state machine because it gives the
ability to model the execution flow of actions for an entity to see how it can behave at
a particular state. State machine helps us identifying the possible attack states and
behavior rules can be derived against them to detect the abnormalities. Below we
exemplify how a state machine can be designed to express the normal behavior and
how behavior rules can be extracted from it for generating the specification document.
4.3.1.1 Finite State Machine (FSM)
Finite state machines (FSM) or finite state automata (FSA) is a mathematical model
of computation and commonly used to represent and control execution flow [12].
It can be used to model problems in many fields including mathematics, artificial
intelligence, games etc. Finite state machines provide a powerful way to describe
the dynamic behavior of system components and widely used in specification-based
testing [32]. A state machine consists of set of known states and can be in one of the
finite set of states at any given time. Changing from one state to another is executed
by an event or condition. This state change is called transition. Following are the
main components of Finite State Machine:
• Finite Set of States: there must be a finite amount of states and only one
state can be active at a time
• Initial State: the starting point of the system. Initial states are usually drawn
with an arrow being pointed to them
• Accepting States: a subset of known states that indicates whether the input
we processed is valid or not
• Transitions: events or conditions that describe how the process moves from
one state to another
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4.3.1.2 Designing of FSM Model
FSM model can be designed by mapping the behavior of the application to states
where events and conditions allow the transition from one possible state to another.
This FSM model can help in defining the rules to capture the suspicious activity on
the execution of events in states transition. To illustrate the FSM model, we take
an example of HazelCast IMDG application where a node or member can join the
cluster and perform simple CRUD operations on HazelCast Map. HazelCast Map is
a data structure for storing the data in the memory by mapping a key to value. We
are considering this example because data can be stolen or destroyed present in the
Map by a malicious HazelCast member as it is described in our in-memory PoC in
the section 3.2. With this example, we show the normal behavior of the Map opera-
tions and extract the specifications that defines the rules to identify the abnormal or
suspicious activities at a particular state during run-time.
Fig. 4.3.1: FSM Model for HazelCast Member
Finite State Diagram to express the specifications for a Member in HazelCast in-
memory data grid
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Figure 4.3.1 depicts an example of a finite state machine with the possible states
and actions that can be performed on a HazelCast Map by a cluster member. At
the initial state, an instance of a HazelCast member is instantiated that can create a
request for joining into the cluster. On successful connection to the cluster, a member
will be at the joining state where it can perform further actions on next states.
In the designed FSM model, we have the following properties:
• States: HazelCast member for executing data operations on Map can have:
Member Initializing, Joining, Reading, Adding, Deleting and Updating Entry
states
• Initial State: As the HazelCast member can not join the cluster until its
instance is created. So, initial state in this case is Member Initializing
• Transitions: Each transition dependent on the event performed by the Hazel-
Cast member. If an event is triggered by the member for accessing the data
from the Map, it will be transit from Joining state to the Reading state. In the
same way, events will dictate what could be the next state to move on
• Final State: Leaving the cluster is the final state here and HazelCast member
can not get back to the other states after reaching that state
The illustration of FSM model shows that operations are performed on a Hazel-
Cast map in a sequence to behave as normal action. The activity might be considered
suspicious if the sequence of the actions is not followed. In case of unconventional
malware attack, it is difficult to differentiate between the normal and abnormal be-
haviors by just considering the sequence of actions. Because these malware usually
take advantage of normal actions but having malicious intention in it. For example,
in-memory malware in HazelCast cluster could get access to the data and apply en-
cryption on it as explained in 3.2. Reading the data and updating it after applying
encryption on it follows the same sequence of actions as normal data read and update
operation takes. But continuous reading and updating the entries in a short time
can make it suspicious. Another example of such behaviors can be seen from Fileless
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JavaScript malware described in the section 3.1 that through webSocket connections
malicious code can be downloaded and injected in the visitor‘s browser to perform
malicious activities. In this case, using webSocket in the web applications is a normal
action and identifying the intention of its usage is a challenge. To capture such mali-
cious activities, rules or policies could be specified to identify the suspicious nature of
actions. We extract the specifications by observing the transitions in FSM model by
considering if any possible attack scenario can be occurred while transiting from one
state to another. In the Section 4.3.1.3, we show how rules can be generated from
FSM model to capture the abnormal activities.
4.3.1.3 Specifications Extraction from FSM Model
After designing the FSM model for the entities of the targeted application, we can
extract the specifications on the basis of that model. The specifications vary from one
application to another and depends on the possible normal and abnormal behavior
of the application. We can consider the above mentioned FSM model to see how
specifications can be extracted to define the rules. For writing the specifications, we
have used XSD (XML Schema Definition) [59] that formally describe the elements
in an XML (Extensible Markup Language) document. The reason for choosing XSD
is because it helps in writing the schema for entities with rules for data content and
semantics. It follows formalized standards to describe what a XML document can
contain. A well defined specifications can save from generating the errors and false
rates. An example of some rules is demonstrated in the listing 4.1 that shows the
XSD document based on the FSM model described in Figure 4.3.1. This XML schema
illustrates the rules that should be followed by a HazelCast member to perform data
operations on HazelCast Map.
Rules are specified by considering the transitions from one state to another in the
designed FSM model. Specification should be generated according to the applica-
tion’s requirements by the developer or admin. For example, a rule can be specified
on HazelCast cluster to restrict the number of machines that could join the cluster
because it is an admin level or network administrator level task to know if any new
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machine needs to be added in the cluster or not. To specify this rule in the docu-
ment, considering the transition between Member Initializing and Joining state from
Figure 4.3.1 and generating an element ‘max-members‘ under the ‘hz-member‘ ele-
ment in the XSD document as shown in the listing 4.1. Another example of a rule
is ‘time-to-leave‘ element which has been extracted between the Joining and Member
Leaving state that says a HazelCast member can not leave the cluster before a spe-
cific time. This rule is specified as an example based on the reason that in-memory
malware can behave as a non-persistent attack on HazelCast IMDG and leave soon
after completing the infection scenario. In the same way, other rules can also be
specified against other transitions in the FSM model to restrict the abnormal actions
based on the application‘s need. The rules are defined through XSD which is further
used to extract a simple XML document where the rules will be initialized with the
values according to the application requirement. This XML document will be used
to Listing 4.2 shows the XML document generated from the XSD schema.
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12 <xs:element name="max-members" type="xs:int"/>
13 <xs:element name="time-to-leave" type="xs:int">
14 <xs:attribute name="time-unit" type="timeUnits"\>
15 </xs:element>
16 <xs:complexType name="read-update-latency">
17 <xs:element name="no-of-entries" type="xs:int"/>
18 <xs:element name="time-interval" type="xs:int">















Listing 4.1: Example of XSD document for HazelCast IMDG Cluster
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In this chapter, we perform unconventional malware analysis to know how these mal-
ware behave and deceive the malware analysis tools. This analysis will give us an idea
about how effective and efficient are the existing state-of-the art malware analysis and
reverse engineering tools against emerging and unconventional malware. In addition,
we show the implementation and evaluate the performance and efficiency of our pro-
posed approach. To demonstrate that, how effective and efficient our approach is for
the mitigation of malware threats that uses advance evasion techniques to attack on
unconventional computing platforms, we have considered HazleCast IMDG.
5.1 Unconventional Malware Analysis
The rapidly emerging consequences of unconventional malware and rising sophistica-
tion of advance evasion techniques has motivated advancement in tools and techniques
for performing concentrated analysis on such malware attacks. Malware authors keep
on finding better ways to determine analysis techniques to bypass them. Analysis
of unconventional malware is comparatively different from traditional malware be-
cause of advance evasion techniques used in such malware which can easily deceive
existing malware analysis tools. To understand how severe unconventional malware
is with respect to the available tools and techniques for analysis and detection, we
are presenting our findings based on static, dynamic and memory based analysis of
such malware with both manual and automated malware analysis systems.
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5.1.1 Lab Environment & Tools For Analysis
For performing the analysis, a safe and secure environment is required to prevent the
system from being infected. We have Ubuntu Linux operating system installed on
the physical machine and setup a VM (virtual machine) using Virtual Box software
and installed Ubuntu 18.04.3 LTS, Linux operating system on it. The Linux VM is
used to execute the malware sample during the analysis and following tools are used
to monitor the activities:
• FTK Imager: Installed the command line version of FTK Imager on Ubuntu
for acquiring the memory dump while malware specimen is executing on the
system
• Volatility: It is Python based script that helps in performing the memory
analysis on the captured memory dump
• Wireshark: To capture and monitor the network traffic during the malware
execution
5.1.2 JSLess: Fileless JavaScript Malware Analysis
In order to analyse unconventional malware, we obtained Fileless JavaScript malware
for analysis. We considered analysis on web platform for JSLess (Fileless JavaScript
Malware) mentioned in 3.1. The main objective here is to extract the malicious
behavior of malware that uses unconventional attack techniques and to identify if the
existing analysis techniques are capable enough to trace them. To perform the analysis
after setting up the Lab environment, we have deployed the JSLess PoC on Amazon
Web Services (AWS) server and mapped with a test domain ’https://dev.wasplabs.ca’.
The compromised web application is opened in the Google Chrome browser where
JSLess disperse the infection and the following different types of monitoring carried
out during analysis using various analysis and reverse engineering tools.
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5.1.2.1 Memory Analysis with Volatility
Memory analysis is one of the main components of live investigation to know the
behavior of a malware while malware specimen is executing on the system. Mem-
ory analysis is important for extracting the artifacts relevant to the malicious pro-
gram where infected system executing the malware sample. Memory Acquisition and
Memory analysis are two major steps in the process of memory analysis. Memory
Acquisition involves acquiring or dumping the memory of the target system. In our
case, target system is the virtual machine that we have setup in the lab environment
where we are executing the malware sample. In memory acquisition step, we have
captured the memory image and generated dumped files with FTK Imager tool while
malware executing in the Google Chrome browser on virtual machine. After dump-
ing the memory of the system to disk, for extracting the information from captured
memory dumped file, Volatility tool has been used. With volatility commands, we
listed the processes running on the system at the time of memory acquisition as it is
illustrated in 5.1.1. A process with PID 1332 is listed with name chrome.exe which is
not indicating itself that it is a malicious process because malware is being executed
within a sub process which is hard to determine with process monitoring in memory
analysis.
Fig. 5.1.1: Processes list after fileless malware execution on web app
5.1.2.2 Capturing Network Traffic with Wireshark
When the malware is executed, we captured the network traffic generated as a result
of running the malware. Wireshark is a packet sniffing tool which is used to capture
and monitor the network traffic behavior which allows to generate insights into what
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processes are running within packets in real-time. After capturing the network traffic,
observed the JSLess components tries to connect to a remote server. During our
experiments, connection attempts were observed with Wireshark, when the infected
machine sent packets to a an other server, as shown in Fig. 5.1.2. But there was
not any malicious connection found in memory after the execution of fileless malware
on web. But some network calls were observed, where a handshake was being done
between client and server. But we were not able to get the details of packet as the
communication was being done through a secure channel over HTTPS.
Fig. 5.1.2: Network Traffic monitored during the execution of JSLess
5.1.3 JSLess Analysis using Tools
To examine the website affected with JSLess, we performed the analysis with Multiple
Anti-Virus scanners. We identified seven tools that we considered promising based
on the techniques and the technology they use for detection. Most of the tools apply
both static and dynamic analysis approaches. Some of those tools are commercial,
but they provide a free trial period that includes all the commercial feature for a
limited time. Table 5.1.1 shows the list of tools we used in our study.
By reviewing the results from the detection tools and how those tools work, it is
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Tool Name Detection Technique License Website Detect JSLess
ReScan.pro static & dynamic commercial https://rescan.pro/ 7
VirusTotal static & dynamic free & commerical https://www.virustotal.com/ 7
SUCURI static commercial https://sucuri.net/ 7
SiteGuarding static commercial https://www.siteguarding.com/ 7
Web Inspector static & dynamic free https://app.webinspector.com/ 7
Quttera static & dynamic free & commercial https://quttera.com/ 7
AI-Bolit static & dynamic free & commercial https://revisium.com/aibo/ 7
Table 5.1.1: JavaScript and Web App Malware Detection Tools
obvious that detecting JSLess is not possible. The use of WebSocket to inject and
run obfuscated malicious code, make it almost impossible for any static analysis tool
to detect JSLess, since the malicious payload does not exist at the time of static
analysis. The use of benign JavaScript/HTML5 APIs and features, in addition to
the dynamic injection behaviors also make it very difficult for the current dynamic
analysis tools to detect JSLess. Blocking or preventing new JavaScript/HTML5 APIs
is not the solution and it is not an option.
5.1.3.1 ReScan.Pro
It is a cloud-based web application scanner which takes URL of the website and gen-
erates a scan report after filtering the website for web-based malware and other web
security issues. It explores the website URLs and checks for infections, suspicious con-
tents, obfuscated malware injections, hidden redirects and other web security threats
present. In-depth and comprehensive analysis of ReScan.Pro [55] based on three main
features.
1. Static Page Scanning: combination generic signature detection technique
and heuristic detection. It uses signature and pattern-based analysis to identify
malicious code snippets and malware injections. It also looks for malicious and
blacklisted URLs in a proprietary database.
2. Behavioral Analysis: imitates the website user’s behavior to evaluate the
intended action of implemented functionality.
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3. Dynamic Page Analysis: performs dynamic web page loading analysis
which includes deobfuscation techniques to decode the encoded JavaScript in
order to identify the run-time code injects and it also checks for malware in
external JavaScript files.
We ran the experiment with the ReScan.Pro to test if it will detect the malicious
activities of JSless malware. It generated a well defined report after analyzing the
website with its static and dynamic features. The produced result shows that the
website is clean and no malicious activity has been found. ReScan.Pro could not
detect our JavaScript fileless malware.
Fig. 5.1.3: Rescan.Pro scanning report
5.1.3.2 Web Inspector
This tool runs a website security scan and provides a malware report which has more
information than most other tools. Its security scanner is bit different from others
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because it performs both malware and vulnerabilities scans together. For scanning
a website, it just requires a user to provide the website URL and click on the ‘Start
the Scan’ button. It starts scanning the website and generates the report within
minutes. This tool provides five different detection technologies such as (1) Honeypot
Engine, (2) Antivirus Detection, (3) BlackList Checking, (4) SSL Checking, and (5)
Analyst Research. The Honeypot Engine has special algorithms for Exploit Packs
and multi-redirect malware detection and it gives full web content scan using a real
browser clone with popular plugins. [10]
Web inspector shows a threat report which includes Blacklists, Phishing, Malware
Downloads, Suspicious code, Heuristic Viruses, Suspicious connections, and worms.
Fig. 5.1.4: JSLess detection report by Web Inspector Tool
As described above, Web Inspector provides a report on full web content scanning
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by applying various techniques to detect malware. However, we noticed that our
JavaScript fileless malware was able to successfully deceive this malware detection
tool as well.
5.1.3.3 Sucuri
Sucuri [26] is yet another tool that offers a website monitoring solution to evaluate any
website’s security with a free online scanner. This scanning tool searches for various
indicators of compromise, which includes malware, drive-by downloads, defacement,
hidden redirects, conditional malware, etc. To match more signatures and generate
fewer false positives, it uses static techniques with intelligent signatures which are
based on code anomalies and heuristic detection. Server side monitoring is another
service provided by them which can be hosted on the compromised server to look
for backdoors, phishing attack vulnerabilities, and other security issues by scanning
the files present on the server. Moreover, Sucuri provides a scanning API as a paid
feature to scan any site and get a result similar to what is provided on its internal
malware scanners.
Fig. 5.1.5: Sucuri Online Scanner Report
The Scan report can be seen in Figure 5.1.5. Testing with Sucuri online scanner,
we see it displays that there is ”No Malware Found” as well as a seek bar indicating
a medium security risk. However, this is due to Insecure SSL certificates, not from
the detection of our fileless malware.
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5.1.3.4 Quttera
Quttera[37] is a popular website scanner that attempts to identify malware and suspi-
cious activities in the web applications. Its malware detector contains non-signature
based technology which attempts to uncover traffic re-directs, generic malware, and
security weakness exploits. It can be accessed from any computer or mobile device
through a web browser. It also provides real-time detection of shell-codes, obfuscated
JavaScript, malicious iframes, traffic re-direct and other online threats. We have
tested the infected web application with this tool by providing the URL and the ob-
tained report can be seen in the Figure 5.1.6. Quttera failed to detect our JavaScript
fileless malware as indicated in Figure 5.1.6.
Fig. 5.1.6: Quttera Scanning Report on JSLess detection
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5.1.3.5 VirusTotal
VirusTotal is a free malware inspection tool which offers a number of services to scan
websites and files leveraging a large set of antivirus engines and website scanners
[5]. This aggregation of different tools covers wide variety of techniques, such as
heuristic, signature based analysis, domain blacklisting services, etc. A detailed report
is provided after completing the scan which not only indicates the malicious content
present in a file or website but also exhibits the detection label by each engine.
We scan our compromised web app with VirusTools using 66 different malware
detection engine, and none of those 66 engines was able to detect that the web app
is compromised.
Fig. 5.1.7: VirusTotal Report
5.1.3.6 AI-BOLIT
AI-BOLIT [56] is an anti-malware scanner for websites and hosting. It uses heuristic
analysis and other patented AI algorithms to find malware from any kind of scripts
and templates. We used it to scan our JSLess malware scripts by executing it on the
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server where JSLess scripts were hosted along with the web application files. However,
it failed to detect JSLess and it generated false positive when it considered some of
the core modules of NodeJS as malicious JavaScripts.
5.2 Unconventional Malware Detection
To demonstrate that the proposed approach is an effective solution against uncon-
ventional malware attacks, we have implemented the modules of our technique first.
After the implementation, the malware detection technique has been evaluated by
executing various experiments. In the following, the implementation of the proposed
approach and the results obtained from the experimental evaluation are presented
and discussed.
5.2.1 Experiment Setup
For the implementation of the proposed approach and to perform the experiments,
we setup the environment first by installing the required dependencies and tools
on the Machine. To examine the run-time impact of our implemented system, the
experiments are executed and observed on both Local Network and cloud server en-
vironment.
The machine we used for the implementation and experiments for local network has
the following specifications:
Processor Intel R© CoreTM i7-6600U CPU @ 2.81GHz
RAM 8 GB
Operating System Windows 10 Pro (64-bit)
Table 5.2.1: Experimental System Specifications
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Below are the software installed on the Machine for the implementation and eval-
uation:
NetBeans IDE 8.2
Java Development Kit (JDK) 11
Java Maven
Table 5.2.2: Experimental System Software and Dependencies
5.2.2 Implementation
In applying the proposed approach on HazelCast IMDG, our implementation is based
on the modules described in the section 4.2. We considered the points which might be
vulnerable to in-memory malware in HazelCast IMDG application. We have extracted
the normal behavior of the application and specified it in the XML language. XML
declaration of the specifications can be seen in the listing 5.1 which are based on XML













Listing 5.1: XML specifications document based on XSD
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To detect the in-memory malware threat, we have implemented our proposed
approach along with the HazelCast events which are being monitored and matched
with the specified behavior that can catch such unconventional means of attack.
Various events have been monitored for the implementation of behavior monitoring
module such as, Listing 5.2 shows events declaration for Membership listeners where
a MembershipListener interface is implemented and every time whenever a member
joins, or leaves the cluster, these events will be triggered to observe the execution. In
the same way, ‘EntryListener‘ interface is implemented to observe the data operations
on HazelCast Map.
1 public class ClusterMembershipListener implements MembershipListener {
2
3 public void memberAdded(MembershipEvent membershipEvent) {}
4
5 public void memberRemoved(MembershipEvent membershipEvent) {}
6 }
Listing 5.2: HazelCast Cluster Membership Listeners
5.2.3 Evaluation
To demonstrate that our approach is effective and efficient in the detection of un-
conventional malware infections, we analyze the effectiveness and performance of the
detection system by applying it on HazelCast IMDG application. We used our devel-
oped in-memory malware PoC to perform the malicious activities in the HazelCast
cluster and performed the evaluation of detection technique. Results are observed
by deploying and executing it on both Local Network and cloud server environment.
Different malware infection scenarios has been considered on the implemented system
in our experiments. In the effectiveness, we have evaluated how good are our devel-
oped specifications and how effective is our approach in the detection of in-memory
threat on HazelCast IMDG cluster. In the performance, we have measured the time
overhead during the execution of behavior monitoring module that might increase the
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execution cost by applying the new detection technique on it.
5.2.3.1 Effectiveness
It is very important for any malware detection system to measure the level of effec-
tiveness by knowing the number of false positive and false negative. The effectiveness
of our approach is mainly dependent on the specifications. Good specifications can
give better results and bad specifications can generate more false alarms. As it is
mentioned in the section 3.2 that HazelCast in-memory cluster is vulnerable to two
major threats, where first threat can be from the malicious cluster members which
might become the part of the cluster to perform malicious activities. Second is Hazel-
Cast clients that can connect to the cluster having malicious intention. Both of the
entities can spread different infection scenarios, the common attack vector in both of
the cases is accessing the data present in the memory and modifying it with encryp-
tion. In our experiments, we have considered this attack scenario and developed the
specifications to detect the abnormal activity.
Updating the data by applying encryption on it is done through the normal read
and update operations, we are trying to observe the malicious intention in doing this
operation. In the specifications, we have described a rule for read and update time
latency. In this rule, the ratio of read and update operations with the number of
entries by time interval is defined. This rule is generated by analyzing the behavior of
reading and updating during in-memory malware encryption attack. The records are
fetched and updated consecutively in a short span of time that indicates the abnormal
behavior of data operations during the attack. In XML document, we defined that
500 entries are allowed in every 1000 ms. If any data operation violate this rule,
it will be considered as abnormal or suspicious behavior. We have performed the
experiments to identify the abnormal behavior of data operations performed by both
HazelCast member and client.
For evaluating the developed specifications against the infection scenario per-
formed by HazelCast member, we have initiated a member from one machine on the
local network having malicious intention. Multicast discovery mechanism has been
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used to discover the members to join within the cluster. This new member accessed
the entries saved in the HazelCast distributed map and started encrypting the data.
Behavior monitoring events triggered when a new member inserted in the cluster and
started tracking the activities being performed in the cluster. A malicious client also
connected to the cluster and captured the results of data operation against it. The
read, write and update operations on HazelCast Map is monitored by HazelCast ‘En-
tryListener‘ interface. Whenever an entry is accessed or updated, we are tracking the
activity and storing the time which is then compared with the specified rules, on each
Map read and update operation. With both Hazel member and client we accessed
and encrypted the data by considering different no of entries and observed that how
specified rules worked. Results of the effectiveness measurement are summarized in
Table 5.2.3.




Encryption with malicious member 5000 1501 ms
Encryption with malicious member 500 157 ms 7
Encryption with malicious client 5000 2137 ms
Encryption with malicious client 500 314 ms 7
Table 5.2.3: Effectiveness Results of Implemented Approach
In specification-based technique, accuracy depends on specified rules. It is possible
that bad specifications can result into more false alarms or not alarm at all. Achieving
100% accuracy is not possible in all the cases such as in above mentioned scenario if
more than one malicious clients or members divide the data operations, it might be
possible that rule breaks and does not catch by the detector. False alarms may also
be generated if a normal operation without any malicious intention read and update
operations consecutively in a short time. Considering these facts, we can not say that
this technique can gives 100% effectiveness but it is one of the possible solution that
can help in decreasing the threat level by generating an alarm.
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5.2.3.2 Performance
In the experiments, we measured the performance of the events executing to monitor
the behavior of the application. In each event, it loads the specifications required
for that event and match with the running behavior. HazelCast members and clients
related events have been monitored while applying some infection scenarios. To calcu-
late the performance, we have recorded some activities before executing the malware
scenarios and compared with after facts of behavior monitoring events execution. A
cluster has been configured on HazelCast Cloud and it can be seen in the Figure
5.2.1 that 26 Java client connections are opened with the cluster before executing the
infection scenarios. We have also calculated the performance overhead by connecting
different number of clients to see whether overhead time increases by increasing the
number of clients are not.
Fig. 5.2.1: Clients connected with HazelCast Cloud Cluster
Every time when a client connects to the cluster, our behavior monitoring module
captures the details of that connection to monitor the client activities in other events.
We have total of 8 events present in the behavior monitoring module to handle various
scenarios and keep a constant eye on the activities being performed in the HazelCast
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cluster.
Fig. 5.2.2: HazelCast Map Entry Count & Used Memory
In each event, execution start time and end time has been recorded to calculate the
performance overhead. To analyze the performance in more realistic environment, a
HazelCast Map is filled with more than 100,000 entries inserted by multiple HazelCast
clients which has taken 13 MB of total cluster memory as it is shown in the Figure
5.2.2. The execution time of behavior monitoring events is recorded while other
cluster operations were also being executed normally.
Fig. 5.2.3: HazelCast Map Average Latency & throughput
Figure 5.2.3 shows the average latency and throughput of HazelCast Map which
is recorded and compared it after the execution of detection technique to see whether
the performance of other operations has been effected by the implemented detection
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approach. For the measurement of performance after recording the mentioned activ-
ities, one client joins the cluster to infect the map entries stored in the memory of
the cluster. After starting the infection scenario, start and end time of the events is
recorded to calculate the average time overhead.
The time is calculated for the behavior monitoring events that ranges between 0
and 8 milliseconds for each event during the normal and abnormal behavior of the
HazelCast operations. Figure 5.2.4 depicts the average latency of data read/write
operations and throughput which is recorded while the events were executing. It
is discovered that the performance is not affected by applying the implemented ap-
proach on the application as the average time calculated is 4.6 ms which is not having
a significant impact on the performance of the application.
Fig. 5.2.4: HazelCast Cluster Map Metrics after running implemented approach
Time is calculated in total of 5 cycles of time monitoring for each event and
recorded the minimum and maximum time overhead in each event. Average time
overhead is calculated on the basis of min and max time overhead by total number of
test cycles. The same process of time monitoring is performed by connecting various
number of clients to see how performance is affected by joining more clients. The
results of time calculation against each event is presented in Table 5.2.4 which is
recorded by connecting 26 clients. We observed that time depends on functionality
implemented in the event monitoring methods.
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Member Added 6 ms 7 ms 6.4 ms
Member Removed 4 ms 6 ms 5 ms
Client Connected 5 ms 6 ms 5.2 ms
Client Disconnected 3 ms 3 ms 3 ms
Map Entry Added 4 ms 5 ms 4.6 ms
Map Entry Updated 6 ms 8 ms 7.2 ms
Map Entry Loaded 3 ms 4 ms 3.4 ms
Map Entry Removed 2 ms 3 ms 2 ms
Total Average 4.6 ms
Table 5.2.4: Performance time overhead calculated against each event
The performance measurement results are summarized in Table 5.2.5 where it










10 8 5 4.3 ms
18 8 5 4.6 ms
26 8 5 4.6 ms
Table 5.2.5: Performance Results of Implemented Approach
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5.3 Approach Benefits
Due to the limitations of existing state-of-the art malware detection tools and tech-
niques, specification based method with continuous behavior monitoring is one of
the possible solutions to mitigate emerging and unconventional malware attacks. It
can provide efficient results for not only unconventional attack techniques but it is
also capable of detecting both known and unknown malware which is impossible with
the help of static or signature based malware detectors. The other benefit of this
methodology is providing low level of false positive results. The main reason of the
failure of traditional malware detectors against unconventional attacks is because this
malware family use legitimate or benign features of the targeted application. Con-
tinuous behavior monitoring with proposed approach can give better understanding
of how actions are behaving and specification based technique can help in finding the
abnormality of those actions. Moreover, our approach is cost and time efficient in the
comparison of manual analysis. In the manual analysis, it requires enough time to
carefully analyze the behavior of the malware to find the suspicious activity where it
also increases the cost of hiring security engineers and experts. But automating this
manual analysis can save the time of performing the analysis of events and saves the
cost as well. It is one time cost of writing the specifications and implementing the
system to monitor the behavior of the application at the run time but it can save the
time and cost after that and provides better results.
5.4 Limitations
The proposed approach is one of the possible solutions to mitigate the emerging and
unconventional malware attacks. But along with having advantages over other tra-
ditional malware detection techniques, this approach has some limitations as well.
Major challenge with this approach is developing the specifications of legitimate pro-
gram behavior. More detailed or strict specifications can be a bad approach because
of few reasons. First, developing more detailed specifications would require more
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effort than describing more abstract form of specifications. Second, more detailed
and strict specifications may create the possibility that could classify some events as
invalid due to minor difference in the interpretation and it could cause of high false
alarms. Large specifications might also result in scalability problem. The accuracy
of this technique is dependent on the specifications, well defined rules can give better
results. It is very important to define the rules for all the possible attack scenario
according to the targeted applications need.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion & Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
A detailed and comprehensive study of emerging and unconventional malware attacks
has been discussed in this thesis and presents a methodology for the mitigating these
attacks. Modern malware that take advantage of trending technologies to evade
detection are explored in our research. We introduced the design and implementation
of some unconventional attack proof-of-concepts that targets web applications and
in-memory computing platforms. Further, to know the severity of unconventional
malware with respect to available tools and techniques for analysis and detection,
the current state-of-the art malware analysis and protection techniques has been
evaluated. In the result of our analysis process, we could not find enough artifacts
with existing analysis and reverse engineering techniques that we have used in our
experiments. The main reason of failure for existing malware analysis tools is the
use of advance evasion techniques used by attackers in the creation of unconventional
malware attack which leaves almost no trace for forensics and reverse engineering.
This thesis implements a new approach for the detection of unconventional at-
tacks. Although there are several malware detection techniques which are effective
against traditional malware detection, they are not perfect for unconventional attacks.
These techniques could be executed together in a hybrid approach to have better per-
formance. To overcome the shortcomings of existing malware detection techniques, a
new approach is introduced by combining the strengths of two different detection tech-
niques which makes it an effective solution against unconventional malware attacks
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detection. First approach specification-based that describes the expected behavior of
the application and the second technique is behavior-based analysis that matches the
running behavior of the application with the written specifications. An event is con-
sidered a security violation if it does not conform to the pre-defined specification rules
and generate an alarm. To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first effort
to apply specification-based detection techniques to detect unconventional malware
attacks.
We evaluated our proposed methodology by applying it on HazelCast in-memory
data grid to detect the exploitation of in-memory malware infection. Our experi-
mental results indicate that the new, automated protection solution is effective and
efficient in detecting unconventional attack for unconventional attacks if specifications
are written in a good way.
6.2 Future Work
As emerging and unconventional attacks are keep growing, this research is an impor-
tant contribution towards the mitigation of such advance threats. In the future, we
plan to carry on investigating the possibilities of more advanced malware threats in
other unconventional computing environments such as Internet of things, in-memory
computing environments (e.g., Redis, Spark etc). We also aim to verify the effective-
ness of proposed method on Fileless JavaScript malware attack in web applications
and to confirm that the expected behavior of this new method does not affect by the
application scenario and characteristics. The accuracy of the proposed approach is
dependent on the developed specifications, for this reason there is need to introduce
a language or more compact way to write meaningful specifications. This would also
be important to showcase more kinds of specification properties to cover almost all
the possible attack scenarios.
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IoT Internet of Things
HTML Hypertext Markup Language
IBM International Business Machines
CNN Convolutional Neural Network
GANs Generative Adversarial Network
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
CAN Controller Area Network
RAM Random Access Memory
APIs Application Programming Interface
VM Virtual Machine
TF-IDF Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency
SVM Suuport Vector Machine
CPU Control Processing Unit
FPR False Positive Ratio
IP Internet Protocol
PoC Proof of Concept





XSD XML Schema Design
XML Extensible Markup Language
W3C World Wide Web Consortium
AWS Amazon Web Services
ISPEC International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
IMDG In Memory Data Grid
JDK Java Development Kit
IDS Intrusion Detection System
FSM Finite State Machine
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What is XML Schema Design (XSD)?
XSD, a recommendation of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), specifies how to
formally describe the elements in an Extensible Markup Language (XML) document.
It can be used by programmers to verify each piece of item content in a document.
They can check if it adheres to the description of the element it is placed in [59].
XSD Schema Components
The main components of a schema are [70]:
Element declarations
It define properties of elements. These include the element name and target names-





Listing 1: XSD Element
Attribute declarations
It define properties of attributes. Again the properties include the attribute name
and target namespace. An attribute declaration may also include a default value or
a fixed value [70].
1 <xs:attribute name="xxx" type="yyy"/>
2 <xs:attribute name="lang" type="xs:string" default="EN"/>
3 <xs:attribute name="lang" type="xs:string" fixed="EN"/>
Listing 2: XSD Attribute
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Simple and complex types
Simple types (also called data types) constrain the textual values that may appear in
an element or attribute. Complex types describe the permitted content of an element,







Listing 3: Simple Type Example
1 <xs:element name="employee" type="personinfo"/>
2 <xs:complexType name="personinfo">
3 <xs:sequence>
4 <xs:element name="firstname" type="xs:string"/>
5 </xs:sequence>
6 </xs:complexType>
Listing 4: Complex Type Example
Comments in XML & XSD
The syntax for writing comments in XML is similar to that of HTML:
1 <!-- This is a comment -->




The source code for the fileless JavaScript malware and the target web app is available
on the following GitHub repository: https://github.com/f-babar/JSLess
HazelCast in-memory malware source code is available on the following GitHub repos-
itory: https://github.com/f-babar/in-memory-malware-poc
And the source code for unconventional malware detection can be found on GitHub
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